Geneva 21 June 2007
Issued by the ACP Group, the Africa Group, the LDC Group, Bolivia and Venezuela
PART I: CENTRALITY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE DOHA PROGRAMME
Our groupings and countries represent a large proportion of developing country members in the WTO. The present stage of negotiations in the Doha Work Programme (DWP) is crucial. It is thus imperative that the WTO membership and the world public be reminded that the central objective of the DWP is to help developing countries achieve development. The Doha Ministerial Declaration (para 2) states: “We recognise the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.”
The ACP Council of Ministers, at its session in Brussels on 22-24 May 2007, adopted a Decision on the WTO Doha Negotiations in which the Ministers reiterated “that the development dimension must be included in all aspects of the results of the Doha Round.”
For the developing countries, what matters in this Round is the content of the agreements, which must translate into positive outcomes for our trade and trade balance, improvement in production and supply capacity, and increased employment and incomes of our people. These are among the development yardsticks by which proposals, negotiations, modalities and texts have to be assessed.
We are also concerned that the Round should be completed as soon as possible. This has to be done by ensuring that the content of the proposals and draft texts conforms to the development interests of developing countries. Content cannot be sacrificed for timelines. It is more important to get the agreements right than to meet deadlines. Therefore the WTO members should not be rushed into agreements on modalities, if they are not satisfied that the development concerns are fully taken into account.
A statement issued after the G20 Ministerial meeting with coordinators of developing country groups on June 11 2007 stated: “Developing countries’ support for the urgent conclusion of the Round is contingent upon a result that, in each area of the negotiations and in the overall balance of the single undertaking, fully delivers on the commitment to make this a development round, by placing the interests and needs of developing countries, especially the least developed among them, at its heart.” We fully support this.
We are concerned that some of the most critical issues for many developing countries have been marginalised or left behind as the negotiations have proceeded. For example, the S&D and Implementation Issues were to be resolved ahead of agriculture and NAMA, but these have been now given low priority. Focus is put on so-called core market access issues in NAMA and agriculture; while issues of more concern to many developing countries such as commodities, preference erosion, cotton, tariff escalation, Green Box subsidies, net food importing developing countries, have been given less attention.
It is imperative if the Round is to be completed that the concerns and issues that matter to a majority of developing countries are dealt with satisfactorily, and that our development interests are truly addressed and promoted.
PART II: PROCESS
A. Participation and Transparency
The ACP Council of Ministers, in its meeting in Brussels on 22-24 May 2007, adopted a Decision on the WTO Doha Negotiations, reaffirmed that the WTO negotiating processes “should be transparent, inclusive and with a bottom-up approach”; and underlined that “ACP members should be accorded adequate time to examine in detail the proposals submitted by other WTO Members and Chairs of the negotiating bodies with a view to consulting their respective authorities and taking informed decision on these proposals.”
In this context, we reaffirm the centrality of the principles of transparency, full participation of all members, and the multilateral process. The views, concerns and interests of the majority of members should be fully reflected in the negotiations, in the modality papers and in the outcomes.
A major positive feature of the multilateral trading system is the principle that it allows all trading partners the opportunity to participate in making the rules. The legitimacy of the WTO rests on whether this principle is adhered to. We have been concerned that the recent negotiating process has been less than transparent and participatory. Although it is widely known that important negotiations are taking place in the G4 process, the vast majority of members have little or no knowledge of the progress and content of different stages of the negotiations. Although two developing countries are part of the G4, we cannot expect them to carry the responsibility of representing the views and positions of all developing countries. We have been told that the Geneva multilateral process is central, but without knowledge of the political or technical aspects of the G4 negotiations, it is not possible for the majority of members to prepare themselves or provide inputs. We are concerned that members may be faced with texts arising from small plurilateral processes and requested to consider them at very short notice and to adopt them for the sake of the system. As we are the majority of members of the system, we have the right to know what is going on and to be given the opportunity to participate.
We therefore call for a much more transparent and participatory overall process. The multilateral process with full participation of all members in discussion and in preparing the drafts and final texts must be central. The multilateral system cannot be used to rubber stamp and legitimise the decisions made by a few members.
B: Full Modalities and not Partial Modalities Needed
The Doha Work Programme outcome is a “Single Undertaking.” All issues that are important to members must be considered in a balanced and equitable manner. The modalities and solutions for all issues therefore have to be considered and settled simultaneously. It is unfair to seek a deal first on so-called “core issues” and to promise that “other issues” be settled later. Firstly, it is a matter of subjective interpretation what the “core issues” are because different members have different priorities. Secondly, there is a concern that “other issues” will be left aside after the so-called “core issues” are settled. It is recalled, for instance, that S&D and Implementation Issues were once considered priority issues, but after Cancun they were not included in the so-called four key issues to resolve, and they have fallen aside, despite promises that they are equally important.
We therefore cannot accept the concept that there will be “partial modalities” to be settled first (for instance by end of July 2007), with only some issues included, while excluding others. Our position is that any settlement of modalities has to be on the whole range of issues of importance to the membership. There has to be “full modalities.” The issues that we wish to include are, inter alia, SDT, Implementation Issues and Concerns, duty free and quota free market access for LDCs and simplified and transparent Rules of Origin, special concerns of Small and Vulnerable Economies, commodities, tariff escalation, long-standing preferences, cotton, flexibilities for developing countries in agriculture including special products and special safeguard mechanism; special treatment for countries with ceiling bindings in agriculture; special treatment for LDCs and net food-importing developing countries relating to elimination of export credits; operationalisation of the “less than full reciprocity” principle; adequate flexibilities for developing countries in NAMA; special treatment for countries with less than 35% bound tariffs in NAMA (para 6 countries). We recall that many of these issues have been mentioned by the ACP Council of Ministers.
C. Balance between Obligations and Benefits
Another key principle is that for members, especially the developing country members, the level of obligations must be commensurate with the level of benefits to be obtained in the Round. There should not be a situation in which developing countries are asked to undertake obligations which are not matched by the same level of benefits, as the costs will outweigh the benefits, causing a net and disproportionate loss. For developing countries, there are serious concerns that the Round must not result in de-industrialisation or in import surges in agriculture that adversely affect food security, farmers’ livelihoods and rural development. This would defeat the purpose of the development objectives of the Round.
Many developing countries are unable to take advantage of opportunities arising from increased market access resulting from the Round because of factors such as non-tariff barriers and limited supply capacity. Many studies have concluded that most developing countries will gain little or nothing and many will be losers from existing proposals put forward by developed countries. Most of these countries belong to our groupings. Even if assistance is provided to build their supply capacity, it would take a long time before the positive effects are felt. These countries should therefore not be asked to undertake obligations that result in costs and losses which are not made up for by benefits.
D. Principle of Less than Full Reciprocity
It is critical that the negotiations and the outcome adheres to the principle of less than full reciprocity (LTFR), which is affirmed in the Doha Declaration. At the minimal it means that developing countries are to undertake less obligations than developed countries (for example as measured by percentage reduction in tariffs).
However, this principle has a much deeper and broader meaning, as elaborated by several clauses in the GATT Agreement. It is clear that the LTFR principle gives the right to developing countries to make decision on their commitments which they consider to be consistent with their development, financial and trade needs, and they cannot be expected to make commitments inconsistent with their needs, their particular situation and problems.
PART III: SUMMARY OF SUBSTANTIAL POSITIONS AND CONCERNS
The following is a summary of some of our substantive concerns and positions. We reserve the right to present more details of these in due course.
AGRICULTURE
Domestic Support
1. Developed countries must commit to real and effective cuts in their overall trade distorting domestic support (OTDS), combined with effective disciplines and an effective monitoring and surveillance mechanism to avoid box-shifting and concentration.
2. There must be new disciplines for the use of the Green Box subsidies by developed countries to ensure they are really non trade-distorting, as well as the establishment of a strong and effective monitoring and surveillance mechanism. Green Box subsidies, especially those provided as decoupled income support, insurance against income loss and investment aid, should be subjected to eligibility criteria such as low levels of income, status as a producer or landowner, landholding and production level, in a fixed and unchanging base period. There should be thresholds placed on the criteria. We also support the Africa Group and G20 proposals for the expanded use of the Green Box for developing countries.
3. We will not agree with any attempt to re-instate the peace clause.
4. We support the elimination of export subsidies as agreed in Hong Kong and we recall proposals made in this regard by different members and groups.
Market Access
5. We reiterate and support the ACP proposal on agriculture market access in JOB (05)/257/Rev.1.
6. An effective solution must be found for developing country Members with tariff ceilings and homogeneous low bindings through specific modalities.
7. We support the proposals of least developed countries and small and vulnerable economies.
8. We reiterate the position in the joint communication from the G-33, African Group, ACP, and LDCs on special products and the special safeguard mechanism in TN/AG/GEN/17 (dated 11 May 2006), which supported “meaningful modalities to secure simple and operationally effective instruments of SPs and SSM.”
9. On special products, we reiterate the Hong Kong Declaration that developing countries can “self designate” an appropriate number of tariff lines as SPs. We support the G33 position that the selection of SPs is only to be guided by the indicators and not dictated by them. We support the G33 proposal (JOB(05)/304) as the basis for the negotiations.
10. On Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), we reiterate the Hong Kong decision on this issue. We support the G33 proposal in JOB(06)/64 dated 23 March 2006 as the basis for the negotiations. We reaffirm that all developing countries will have recourse to the SSM. For LDCs, the SSM should be delinked from liberalisation.
11. Commodities: We support the proposal on commodities submitted by the Africa Group (TN/AG/GEN/18). Modalities must be adopted that would ensure the elimination of non-trade barriers and that tariff cuts following the application of the formula result in satisfactory reduction in the level of tariff escalation. Where the application of the formula would not be effective in the removal of tariff escalation, there should be bilateral or plurilateral negotiations among the concerned countries, in order to effect the elimination of tariff escalation. We also support the Africa Group’s proposal that provisions of Article XX (h) should be clarified to permit commodity producing countries to enter into commodity agreements for the management of supplies and for stabilization of prices, without having to invite commodity consuming countries to become parties to these agreements. Concrete technical and financial assistance must be provided to commodity-dependent countries.
12. LDCs: We reaffirm our full support for the Hong Kong decision on the need for developed countries and developing countries in a position to do so, to provide duty free quota free market access for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008, and to apply transparent and simplified Rules of Origin in the process. For developed countries facing difficulties in providing full duty free quota free market access, we support the proposal by the Chair of the agriculture negotiations for setting a specific deadline for extending DFQF treatment to the remaining 3% of tariff lines, i.e. by the end of the implementation period.
13. Cotton: We support the proposal submitted by the Cotton-4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) in June 2006 regarding the reduction in the specific measure of support applicable to cotton. We reaffirm the decision in Hong Kong requesting the elimination in 2006 of all forms of subsidies granted to cotton by developed countries. We also propose that developed countries, will, and developing countries in a position to do so, should provide duty free and quota-free access for imports of cotton from LDCs. This could cover imports from all developing countries as well. We stress the need to set up a mechanism to deal with the loss of revenue that cotton producing countries in Africa are facing as a result of declining cotton prices.
14. Longstanding preferences and preference erosion: We urge that the agriculture negotiations and modalities fully address the issue of erosion of preferences through appropriate and meaningful trade solutions. The issue of longstanding preferences is vital. Its importance is duly recognized both in the July Framework and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. We will not be able to join a consensus on a modalities text which does not address through appropriate trade measures the issue of preference erosion in a meaningful and effective manner. Failure to do so would impose a disproportionate share of the costs of reform on some of the poorest and most vulnerable Members of the WTO. We reiterate that we have adopted a very constructive approach on this issue throughout the negotiating process and have in this regard submitted a list of products, benefiting from preferences, which must be given due consideration along the lines mentioned in the Agriculture Chairman’s draft modalities text of July 2006, including a longer transition period for tariff reduction for such products. We note that the ACP Group is in the process of refining their original list of products submitted. We are concerned by the very minimalist approach taken by the Agriculture Chair in his Challenges Paper and which limits products covered under longstanding preferences to merely two products. We call on the Chairman to reinstate in any modality text the options outlined in his July 2006 Draft Modalities Text.
15. Tropical and diversification products. Due consideration should be given to the overlap between liberalisation of tropical products and products relating to preference erosion. The lists for tropical products liberalisation and for preference erosion have to be dealt with together. A balanced solution is also needed to address the mandates for tropical products and for products of particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic drugs.
16. We stress the importance of strengthening disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions provided under Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture (applied as unilateral coercive measures), as mandated in paragraph 50 of the July 2004 Framework and affirm that the proposal in JOB (06)/147 is a good basis for addressing the issue.
NAMA
17. We insist that the principle of “less than full reciprocity” is fully respected and adhered to in the modalities and the outcome of negotiations. We will not accept any modalities and outcome of negotiations that will lead to de-industrialisation in developing countries.
18. On flexibilities for countries under paragraph 6 of the July 2004 framework on NAMA, we support the proponents of the paragraph 6 proposal for a binding coverage of up to 70% and at an overall average tariff rate of 28.5%.
19. On flexibilities for small and vulnerable economies, we support that a solution for SVEs shall be found outside the formula, in a banded approach that adequately addresses the dispersion of the current bound averages of the proponents.
20. On least developed countries, we support the process outlined by the LDC Group on the implementation of the Hong Kong Decision on the Duty Free Quota Free Market Access for the LDCs in accordance with the LDC Market Access proposal TN/MA/W/78 dated 30 June 2006.
21. We support the position expressed by the NAMA 11 group of developing countries in TN/MA/W/86 dated 8 June, including the principles of “double proportionality” (less than full reciprocity principle and balance between NAMA and agriculture negotiations) and the need for expanded flexibilities for developing countries.
22. We reiterate the vital role of long standing preferences in the development of our countries and urge in this regard the WTO NAMA Negotiating Group to fully address the issue of erosion of preferences through appropriate and meaningful trade solutions, taking into account the constructive proposal of the ACP Group in NAMA
Services
23. We reaffirm that each developing country has the right to choose the commitments in GATS that it wishes to make, and developing countries should thus not be subjected to pressure to make offers. The bilateral request-offer process should remain the main method of negotiations and participation in other processes of negotiations should be voluntary.
24. There should be no attempt to re-introduce any forms of bench-marking, or use of formulae and guidelines to pressurise developing countries to increase their commitments. Any restricted negotiating processes (“Green Room” or small-group meetings) should be fully representative and in line with the principles of inclusiveness and transparency (i.e. they should not be restricted only to those having participated in plurilaterals).
25. We insist on the need for effective implementation of GATS provisions on improving market access in sectors and modes of export interest to developing countries, especially Modes 1 and 4.
26. Disciplines on Domestic Regulation under the GATS should not constrain the ability of developing countries to regulate services in order to meet their developmental needs and to ensure access and availability of essential services to their citizens. The proposed draft disciplines on Domestic Regulation may no longer formally contain the term “necessity test”; however the proposed disciplines couched with implicit operational necessity tests may still constrain domestic regulatory policy flexibility of developing countries, and therefore improvements to the draft are required.
27. We fully support proposals for provisions in GATS which exclude the applicability of GATS rules and commitments with regard to water services and other essential services. Besides, developing countries require provisions which also guarantee universal access.
28. We urge members to consider seriously the proposal on the Mechanism for Granting Special Priority to LDCs that the LDC Group tabled. The LDCs are concerned over the lack of progress in the implementation of the Hong Kong Ministerial decision on the development of a mechanism for granting special priority to the LDCs in line with the modalities for the Special Treatment for LDCs in the negotiations on trade and services adopted in 2003.
Special and differential treatment (SDT) and Implementation Issues
29. SDT and Implementation Issues are key development issues that were provided priority status in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Unfortunately the negotiations in these two areas have been increasingly marginalised, with few positive results so far. We insist that the outcome in these issues should not be left to the end of the negotiations, but should be part of the core modalities which should be settled at the same time as other important issues.
Rules
30. We call upon WTO members to adopt rules and provisions in Regional Trade Agreements that allow developing countries to have adequate development flexibilities, including non-reciprocal commitments and the SDT principle (as reflected in the submission on RTAs made by the ACP Group in TN/RL/W/155 dated 28 April 2004) when negotiating and concluding bilateral and regional trading arrangements with developed country members. We propose clarifications and modifications in the existing provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 to incorporate S&D treatment for developing countries and submit that the Enabling Clause should be preserved to continue to provide the legal basis within which to negotiate South-South RTAs.
31. On fisheries subsidies disciplines, we reiterate the importance of ensuring that the interests and concerns of ACP coastal and island states and SVEs are fully addressed and that special and differential treatment provisions shall be an integral part of any outcome of the negotiations.
TRIPS
32. We support the proposal, co-sponsored by the Africa Group together with other developing countries, on the requirements of disclosure of countries of origin, prior informed consent and benefit sharing, in relation to patent applications involving genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. An agreement to amend the TRIPS Agreement in this regard should be an integral part of the outcome of the Doha Round.
33. We reiterate the importance of the review process of Article 27.3b of the TRIPS Agreement, including the treatment of patenting of micro-organisms and microbiological process, and the sui generis system in relation to plant varieties.
Trade Facilitation
34. We reiterate that technical assistance and capacity building and special and differential treatment are integral parts of any outcome on Trade Facilitation. We therefore envisage commitments and adequate and effective mechanisms on technical assistance and capacity building. In that context, we recall the unique and specific mandate outlined in Annex D of the July 2004 Framework Agreement which links the undertaking of commitments to the provision of technical assistance and capacity building.
Aid For Trade
35. Although Aid for Trade is not part of the Single Undertaking, we reaffirm the importance of implementing effectively the recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade and making Aid For Trade additional, non-conditional, predictable, sustainable and effective.
Enhanced Integrated Framework
36. We welcome the recommendations of the EIF Task Force, and we further urge the IF Agencies incorporating partners to ensure speedy and effective implementation of the recommendations.
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